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Abstract
The natural gas supply of the Eastern European countries located
between Germany and Russia has always been problematic. A historical
reliance on Russia has been eased by increased connectivity to the West.
Recent developments may lead to a diversied source but via a single
supply route, which, in the light of the 2017 Baumgarten explosion, may
introduce another type of risk.
We propose a novel framework to measure the supply security of nat-
ural gas networks, combining a linear programming approach with a risk
assessment technique borrowed from nance which measures supply secu-
rity in European countries. The expected shortfall (ES) is currently the
best practice for risk measurement recommended by one of the most im-
portant international nancial regulators, the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision. ES assigns risks by looking at a fraction of the worst
cases of supply disruptions. The latter is modelled as the change in the
optimal network ow in the case of one of the pipelines falling out due to
certain incidents.
Several network congurations are considered along with seasonal sce-
narios corresponding to the dierence in the availability of gas from stor-
age facilities. We nd that the construction of Nord Stream 2, that is,
doubling the capacity of the direct connection between Russia and Ger-
many alleviates the gas shortage problem if the connection via Ukraine
1
is shut down, otherwise, the construction increases the risk for Eastern
Europe.
JEL codes: C71, D72
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1 Introduction
Amidst an increasing trend of renewables in energy production, natural gas
remains a versatile, widely accepted energy source. Gas-fuelled power stations
are exible, making them ideal as reserves to smooth out demand shocks or
complement supply shocks in variable renewables. Due to its role in household
heating, any shortage is extremely noticeable and has an immediate impact.
Natural gas is transported via pipelines or ships in liqueed form (LNG)
which must be regasied to enter the pipeline network. Both LNG ports and
pipelines require substantial investments and, consequently, the pipeline net-
work suers from congestion problems: some regions may experience supply
constraints or must be supplied via long, expensive detours in the network.
Congestion problems are especially pronounced in winter periods as natural gas
is used extensively for heating and many countries have established storage fa-
cilities to smoothen out demand seasonality and alleviate demand shocks or
transport disruptions.
Our interest is in the European gas network, characterised by a high re-
liance on gas from Russia with additional supply from gas elds in the North
Sea (Norway), North Africa, Central Asia and  increasingly  LNG to meet
demand. We focus on developments in Eastern Europe. Until the opening of
Nord Stream in 2011, most gas from Russia was transported via Ukraine. After
the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes that eventually resulted in gas
delivery disruptions to several European countries, Russia started to look for
alternative delivery routes bypassing Ukraine. Nord Stream, opened in 2011, to-
gether with its nearly complete capacity extension Nord Stream 2 is now able to
replace the Ukrainian pipelines in terms of transmission capacity. Russia's main
partner, Germany is surely a winner of these developments for getting its energy
via a direct connection. Countries in the Eastern ends of the European Union
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(Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, as well as countries on the Balkans), have made
substantial progress in diversifying their sourcing and building interconnectors
(Tarnawski, 2015). Now, with the prospect of Ukrainian pipelines phased out,
they must prepare for the situation where, once again, all their energy supply
comes via a single pipeline. With one dierence: the Brotherhood pipeline car-
ried gas for Germany and other Western European countries so disruptions set
major powers into motion, while the prospect is to be at the end of a pipeline
that crosses half of Europe. Intuitively, incidents such as the 2017 Baumgarten
blast shall eect the region more drastically.
Ours is not the rst paper to study supply security (or security of supply,
abbreviated as SOS ) and transport security in particular. Well before the 2009
Russia-Ukraine gas dispute, Weisser (2007) put out a manifesto warning of the
risk of limited sourcing and a possible shock comparable to the Oil Crisis, calling
for action. Despite eorts to increase connectivity and regulate the market, the
interest in the supply security of natural gas to various markets remains (Cabalu,
2010; Doukas et al., 2011; Biresselioglu et al., 2015; Lu et al., 2016). These stud-
ies take many dierent aspects into account. Cabalu (2010) considers gas supply
interruptions, volatile gas prices, transportation and distribution bottlenecks
and a growing reliance on long-distance imports, exploring the vulnerability of
certain Asian countries. Stern (2002) distinguishes between source-, transit- and
facility-dependence as the main sources of risks in an import-dependent country.
The risks caused by source or facility-dependence include strikes by Norwe-
gian platform workers (World Gas Report, 1986; Adomaitis and Solsvik, 2020),
a bombing of an on-shore section a pipeline in Algeria (Energy Compass, 1997)
causing long-term concerns of similar attacks, the shutting down of the Arun liq-
uefaction plant in Indonesia for several months due to political instability (Gas
Matters, 2001), the 2017 Baumgarten incident (Vainio, 2017) that led Italy to
declare a state of emergency (Hassel and Egenhofer, 2017; Bartelet and Mulder,
2020) and the general political and commercial risks of trading with certain
countries.
For transit-dependence, Stern (2002) already mentions the case of Russian
transits via Ukraine but the 2009 January crisis aected the supply of 18 coun-
tries, causing more severe outages than any gas dispute before (Pirani et al.,
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2009) and still causing concern as tensions continue.
Our approach is closest to that of Scotti and Vedres (2012) and Praks et al.
(2015) in focusing on the network, rather than just the availability of sources.
The eect of disruptions in the transportation network is scrutinised using the
simplied model of the pipeline network (Csercsik, Hubert, Sziklai, and Kóczy,
2019) and an intuitive model to determine the optimal ows assuming rational
payo-maximising agents. We examine the exposure of dierent countries to
transport disruptions as well as the eect of network developments thereon:
beyond a baseline scenario, considering a closing of the Ukrainian corridor, the
completion of Nord Stream 2 as well as a combined scenario. These are currently
the most neuralgic points in the European network development scene, see e.g.
(Jiru²ek, 2020; Tóth et al., 2020; Sziklai et al., 2020; Wood and Henke, 2021). We
include the Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic Pipelines (TANAP and TAP)
in the analysis; the more recent TurkStream and Balkan Stream are not present
in our data set yet.
Network disruptions may aect countries in dierent ways: resulting in a
small price increase  a positive eect is uncommon  or even a massive shortage.
We assume that shortages can be supplied from storage facilities when these are
full  at the end of the summer  but storage facilities must be relled before the
winter months when consumption may exceed supply. If the incident happens
in the winter when storages are depleted, any shortage must be compensated
by diverting consumption to other energy sources at substantial costs. We refer
to these cases as the summer and winter scenarios.
While several indicators have been introduced for supply security for natu-
ral gas and energy in general (Kruyt et al., 2009; Vianello and Maschio, 2014;
Pavlovi¢ et al., 2018), our approach and indicator is new. The expected short-
fall became the standard risk measure in nance dethroning value-at-risk (VaR),
after some weaknesses have been identied in VaR analyses including the mea-
sure's inability to capture 'tail risk' (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2013). Apart from bearing the recommendation of the Basel Committee, it also
has sound theoretical foundations (Acerbi, 2002; Adam et al., 2008).
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we introduce our model,
elucidating on its limitations. Next, we discuss the data collected and nally
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present and discuss the main ndings.
2 Model
In the absence of disruptions, calculating the gas supply of a country or region
is a simple optimisation task, where gas is purchased from the available sources
taking prices, transportation costs and capacity constraints into account. First,
this optimisation problem is described along with the assumptions made. Then
our notion of supply security is explained clarifying the winter and summer
scenarios. We end the section with an example.
2.1 Notation
The international natural gas pipeline network is examined to identify countries
with nodes and pipelines with the arcs. The set of nodes is denoted by N ,
|N | = n with a generic element denoted by i or j. The set of arcs is denoted
by L, |L| = m with the generic element l. The network itself is described by
an incidence matrix A ∈ Rn×m with Ail = −1 and Ajl = 1 indicating that the
pipeline l runs from node i to j.
Each node is either a net producer or net consumer: in case of the former, the
supply exceeds the local demand. Net consumers supply their demand from the
network, from storage or, if these are not possible, switch to other energy sources
or reduce their consumption. As a simplication, we assume that there is an
indigenous, alternative energy source at each node that is more expensive than
any of the natural gas sources including transportation costs and, therefore,
only chosen to overcome shortages. This alternative is not necessarily a real
energy source, it may also represent the economic losses generated by the gas
shortage. This approach has been used by Sziklai, Kóczy, and Csercsik (2020)
as well.
Formally, we assume that each node is characterised by demand and pro-
duction, d0 ∈ Rn+ denotes the vector of demands and s0 ∈ Rn+ the vector of
(maximum) supplies. In the following, we modify these vectors to get d, s ∈ Rn+:
In net producer countries, production is reduced by the local consumption while





i − s0i )+ and si =
∣∣d0i − s0i ∣∣ (2.1)
where (·)+ denotes the positive part, that is (x)+ = max{x, 0} for any x ∈ R.
The production cost is denoted by p ∈ Rn+ where pi = p̄ for all i such that
d0i > s
0
i , where p̄ is the cost of the alternative energy source.
The edges, representing the pipelines, are characterised by maximal trans-
mission capacities in each direction, q = (q+, q−) ∈ R2×m+ . The transmission
capacity dierences are monitored, mostly for technical reasons; while most
pipelines are directed with a reduced reverse ow capacity, changing the direc-
tion is neither costly nor particularly time consuming. Given a bidirectional
pipeline l and a ow fl on it, the net capacity in the direction of the ow is
q+l − fl, while in the opposite direction, there is a capacity q
−
l + fl, where the
last term represents a potential for barters without actual gas transmission.
Transporting gas over these pipelines has its costs. A pipeline may travel
across several regions, making it convenient to dene costs by a cost matrix
C ∈ Rn×m+ where Cij is the cost of transferring a unit gas over pipeline j
occurring in region i. We assume that transportation cost is proportional to the
length of the pipeline.
2.2 Optimal ows
Optimal ow is one that satises the demand while incurring the lowest to-
tal cost. By our assumption of utilising alternative energy sources, satisfying
demands locally is always a feasible solution.
Formally, let f+j ∈ R+ denote the ow in the positive direction over edge
j. Similarly, let f−j ∈ R+ denote ow in the opposite direction. Let I ∈ Rn+






 ∈ R2m+n+ . (2.2)




1 if k = i0 otherwise and eSk =
1 if k ∈ S0 otherwise.
Let ES denote a diagonal matrix with eS over the diagonal, 1n denote an n-
dimensional vector of 1's, Ik×k a k dimensional identity matrix and 0k×l denote
a k × l-dimensional 0 matrix.
We now describe the linear programming problem and interpret the con-






















x ≥ 0 (2.7)
The objective function and constraints are, actually, rather straightforward.
The aim is to minimise the total cost, that is, the sum of the transportation
costs in the positive direction, transportation costs in the negative direction
and the cost of gas itself. Since the transportation costs are non-zero on each
pipeline, gas cannot ow in both directions as it would result in a cheaper ow
with the same resulting supply. The rst constraint explains that no gas is lost
at any of the nodes: the total of inlets, inows and outows must add up to the
consumption of player i. Inlets cannot exceed the supply capacities. The last
condition merely insists on the non-negativity of ows. Finally, constraint 2.6
explains that the ows must not exceed the transmission capacities. Initially,
we set q+ = q− = q.
While this simple optimisation problem helps us nd the optimal paths,
acquiring the individual payos must also be considered. Obtaining these payos
is nontrivial when dierent supply paths  with dierent generalised prices 
intersect. We assume that when gas ows merge the price becomes the weighted
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average of the prices, where weights corresponds to the dierent volumes of
the ows. Since the optimal ows constitute a directed acyclic graph, circular
ows could be eliminated to reduce costs  this calculation is well-dened.
In Section 2.5, we demonstrate how individual payos can be calculated in a
detailed example.
2.3 Supply security
Out of the many factors that aect supply security, our focus lies on the aspects
related to the physical network: on disruptions that put one of the pipelines
out of use, including political risks, natural disasters, technical failures but also
sabotage and terrorism. In order to evaluate such risks, we turn to models used
in nance and the study and the design of electric power grids.
While both are utility networks, the physical properties of the electric power
grids are quite dierent. There are complex laws that determine the ow of
electricity depending on the network characteristics, inputs and outputs and the
electricity cannot be re-routed to reduce the load on a particular connection. In
case of a power-line failure, electricity re-routes itself, increasing the chance of
an overload on one of the other connections. Unless the network is protected
against such primary failures, we may expect a sequence of problems resulting
in widespread and long-term disruptions.
The so-called N − 1 contingency analysis is used to evaluate the would-be
scenario of an incident where one of the power lines drop out (double incidents
have a negligible probability). Majidi-Qadikolai and Baldick (2016) explains
how N − 1 contingency analysis can be applied in the ecient planning of the
power grid to avoid cascading failures after an incident.
Clearly, in the case of natural gas networks, such preparation is unnecessary:
if one of the pipelines is closed down, the closure does not directly aect the
operation of other connections, except that congestions may be more severe.
For the nodes of the network, that is, the countries, the eects may prove to
be more drastic. In the optimal ow supply is redirected to the remaining routes,
increasing congestion along the aected pipelines. As a result, the already
limited transmission capacities are further reduced and some countries may
nd themselves without available gas sources. While a disruption increases the
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overall cost of supplying the network, players may be hardly or severely aected
depending upon their connectedness. In rare cases, a player may even benet
from the change (we will show how this can happen in the example network).
Our analysis covers all possible incidents, that is, scenarios corresponding to
the closure of each of the existing pipelines. We assume that each pipeline fails
with the same probability leading to a random variable that informs the extent
to which each country will be hit in case of an incident. Our method can be
generalised to accommodate pipeline-specic risks.
We evaluate these scenarios using a risk measure (Denault, 2001; Szegö,
2002) which is the (possibly negative) amount of cash that needs to be added to
a problem to make it acceptable and is calculated as a weighted average of all
the scenarios. We express the conservatism of the players by assigning higher
weights to more critical scenarios, in other words, we use spectral risk measures
(Acerbi, 2002). Specically, we employ the α-expected shortfall with α = 10%,
the most popular spectral risk measure in economics and nance. The expected
shortfall takes the (weighted) average of the worst 10% of scenarios; in our case,
this refers to inspecting the disruptions that aect the player least favourably.
2.4 Seasonality
The European natural gas network exhibits a natural seasonality. As the gas
is used for heating, among other services, consumption is higher in the winter
than in the summer. In fact, transmission capacities are often insucient to
cater to winter demands: storage is lled during the summer and, then, in the
winter, the supply is supplemented from the storage. Note that storage is also
used as a reserve to reduce the impact of incidents. We model this dierence
using the following two scenarios:
Winter Reserves are depleted so any gas shortage must be immediately sup-
plied from the network or from an alternative source.
Summer Gas shortages are compensated from the reserves, but these must be
relled, essentially converting a major supply shock into a smaller demand
shock. For simplicity, we assume that relling increases demand by 1/3
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Figure 1: An example with 5 nodes and 6 pipelines and the optimal ow
used if this increased demand cannot be met.
2.5 Example
We consider the simple example presented in Figure 1 (left). This abstract
example has 5 nodes and 6 pipelines connecting them. Two of these nodes
are producers, supplying at most 6 units of gas, p1 = 300, p2 = 400, two are
consumers, utilising 4 each. Node 3 has a balanced production/consumption
pattern and each node has an alternative energy source at p̃ = 600.
The pipelines all have the same capacity q = 3. We assume that transporta-
tion costs are negligible but positive, Cij = ε > 0 and, hence, will be ignored in
the calculations but gas will always travel the shortest route in terms of pipeline
segments.
For such a simple network, the optimal ows are easy to determine (Figure 1,
right). Node i4 obtains all the gas from the cheaper source i1, so that the total
cost is c4 = 4 × 300 = 1200. Node i5 gets 2 from source i1 and the rest from
the more expensive i2 at a total cost of c5 = 2× 300 + 2× 400 = 1400.
Now, let us look at a possible disruption. If pipeline `1 cannot be used, the
ows change drastically. Now supplier i1 is bound by the outgoing transmission












































Figure 2: Optimal ows for disruptions in the winter (disrupted lines are dotted)
What are the costs? Consumer i4 obtains all his gas via i3. But is this gas
from source i1 or, at least in part, from i2? By our assumption, the gas streams
from the two sources are mixed, so from i3, there are 4 units of gas available at a
price calculated as the weighted average of the inows: p3 =
3×300+1×400
4 = 325.
In the winter scenario, consumer i4 obtains 3 units of this gas as well as
the remaining 1 supplied from its alternative source at a cost of 600: c4 =
3× 325 + 1× 600 = 1575, while i5 has c5 = 1× 325 + 3× 400 = 1525.
In the summer scenario, consumer i4 can try to ll the storage in the coming
3 months. This results in a modied demand of 4 13 .
Focusing on the winter scenario, we can now calculate the costs of supply
for all single-pipeline disruption scenarios (Table 1). Given the small number of
states, calculating the expected shortfall (ES) with α = 10% would be the same
as looking at the worst case; instead, we consider α = 13 , in other words, the
average cost under the two worst scenarios (highlighted in Table 1). Therefore,
the ES 1
3
for the two nodes are 1537.5 and 1600 respectively, which constitute a
28% and 14% increase with respect to the status quo. Ostensibly, i4 can be hurt
more by losing its privileged connection to producer i1 and a network disruption
may aect i4 more severely according to our model.
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cost for node without `4
disrupted i4 i5 i4 i5
none 1200 1400 1200 1400
`1 1575 1525 1725 1575
`2 1300 1600 1500 1800
`3 1500 1300 1500 1300
`4 1200 1400 1200 1400
`5 1225 1575 1275 1725
`6 1200 1600 1200 1800
ES (α = 1/3) 1537.5 1600 1612.5 1800
Table 1: Costs for i4 & i5 in the winter scenario. The worst
1
3 are highlighted.
The two right columns show the case when the network does not contain `4.
Note that the disruption of `3 benets i5.
Such comparison is more useful when dierent networks are considered. In
the initial network, pipeline `4 carries no gas, deeming it unnecessary. The
last two columns of Table 1 present the same analysis for a network with only
5 pipelines. It is clear that `4 plays an important role in increasing supply
security by mitigating the risks associated with disruptions. Without `4, the
expected shortfalls are 1612.5 and 1800 with a total increase of 275. While one
must compare this with the construction costs to see if `4 is worth the money,
it is clear that the pipeline is not useless even if it is not used  such as the
Slovakia-Hungary interconnector at Beregdaróc (Badida, 2014).
2.6 Scenarios
Barring the baseline scenario, we consider certain possible developments for the
Eastern corridor.
1. The Ukraine scenario assumes that the connection between Ukraine and
Russia is closed, prompting the investigation into the eect of another
closure.
2. In the second scenario, we calculate using a completed Nord Stream 2,
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3. in the third, the Ukraine-Russia pipeline is phased out once NS2 is oper-
ational.
For each of these scenarios, we have also looked at the eect of the opening
of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline connecting Turkey with Italy via Greece with
a capacity of 20 bcm/yr, carrying cheap gas from Central Asia to the South
Balkans, Italy and beyond.
Generally, the construction of NS2 should alleviate the problem of congestion
on the network, but Gazprom's communication about the Ukrainian pipelines
reaching the end of their service life and the cost of maintaining excessive trans-
mission capacities hints that the two main connections between Russia and
Europe will not coexist for long. We, therefore, think that the impact of NS2's
construction is best illustrated by comparing the rst (Baseline) and last (Com-
bined) scenarios. This will have a drastic eect on Eastern Europe and will incite
interest in seeing whether TAP (and the already operational Trans-Anatolian
Pipeline or TANAP) can compensate for the shift of the main East-West trans-
mission channel to the North. The ongoing development of Balkan Stream will
be an important contribution here.
In the following section, we present the data and results.
3 Data and calculations
The network of international pipelines form a connected network but, often, only
via the national pipeline networks. We, therefore, use a number of simplifying
assumptions (See also Csercsik, Hubert, Sziklai, and Kóczy, 2019)
 Players are reduced to a node; the connecting arcs, where necessary, in-
clude some segments of the national network.
 In the case of Russia and North Africa, distances are measured from the
borders. This makes no dierence for delivery prices.
 LNG is added as a player with a pipeline of the same length as the
liquifying-regasication costs.
 Prices are estimates and the same for all consumers.
13
 The cost of the alternative energy source is estimated at a at 600 M$/bcm.
 Dierences in gas quality are ignored.
Data concerning national resources including natural gas are published reg-
ularly by a number of reliable sources. Transmission capacities were compiled
from the data sheet provided by the International Energy Agency (2020). Con-
sumption and production data was gathered from BP's Statistical Review of
World Energy (BP, 2020). Pipeline lengths were retrieved from the public
database of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas
(ENTSOG, 2019) and other online sources.
4 Results
Our measure for supply security is based on the evaluation of the network with
disrupted pipelines. We assume that all 150 pipelines face the same probability
of incidents and for each country, we are concerned with the worst 10% of the
cases, that is, the 15 (directed) pipelines whose removals give the highest cost
increases for the country at hand.
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Table 2: Expected shortfall values for the dierent network scenarios in winter
(remaining values are constant over all scenarios). TAP and NS2 stand for a
scenario where the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline and Nord Stream 2 are, respectively,
operational, UA for the one where Russia-Ukraine pipelines are closed.
base TAP NS2 NS2+TAP NS2+UA All
Austria 2110 2110 2027 2027 4740 4740
Belgium 10440 10302 5211 5215 5100 5100
Bulgaria 954 835 954 835 1940 1096
Croatia 232 232 232 232 532 532
Czech Republic 2098 2098 2095 2095 2318 2318
France 26023 26023 20107 19111 25836 25836
Germany 21527 21542 20721 20738 23904 23904
Greece 2629 1755 2629 1755 3058 1736
Hungary 2032 2033 2032 2033 4817 4618
Italy 31092 27151 30263 26898 38385 38385
Netherlands 3569 3569 2387 2389 2282 2282
Poland 4541 4505 4456 4456 5255 5255
Romania 303 304 303 304 720 473
Serbia 647 647 647 647 1276 1276
Slovak Republic 1169 1169 1169 1169 2747 2747
Slovenia 237 237 237 237 541 541
Spain 19030 19030 19030 19030 19030 19030
Switzerland 1724 1574 1083 1094 1149 1149
Turkey 11996 10843 11996 10843 13342 11643
Ukraine 2042 2042 2042 2042 4283 4251
United Kingdom 23520 23520 22099 22099 23520 23520
15
Table 3: Expected shortfall values for the dierent network scenarios in summer
(remaining values are constant over all scenarios). As before, TAP and NS2
stand for a scenario where the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline and Nord Stream 2 are,
respectively, operational, UA for the one where Russia-Ukraine pipelines are
closed.
base TAP NS2 NS2+TAP NS2+UA All
Austria 2235 2235 2112 2112 4940 4940
Belgium 10440 10440 5208 5210 5100 5100
Bulgaria 1050 840 1050 840 1956 1105
Croatia 379 379 379 379 870 870
Czech Republic 2140 2140 2116 2116 2342 2342
France 26029 26029 21769 21714 25287 25287
Germany 22150 22201 21209 21230 24377 24377
Greece 2601 1523 2430 1523 3058 1503
Hungary 2182 2183 2182 2184 5171 5171
Italy 28463 23879 25413 22488 34355 34239
Netherlands 4316 4293 4555 4559 4219 4218
Poland 4993 4993 4781 4869 5762 5762
Romania 1123 1123 1123 1123 2660 2127
Serbia 707 707 707 707 1393 1393
Slovak Republic 1177 1177 1177 1177 2766 2766
Slovenia 238 238 237 238 542 542
Spain 18902 18630 18775 18436 19030 19030
Switzerland 1776 1776 1132 1142 1151 1151
Turkey 12443 11137 12452 11137 13418 11685
Ukraine 3593 3593 3593 3593 8420 8420
United Kingdom 22195 22140 19273 17726 22148 22141
16








We observe a drastic dierence in the potential eects of NS2 in two parts of
Europe: the East and West. While the construction of NS2 brings cheap gas and
thereby substantial benets to Western Europe, South-Eastern Europe enjoys
no benet at all. If NS2 is followed by phasing out the Ukrainian gas corridor,
most of Central- and Eastern Europe is left with a highly concentrated supply
path and, if any of the pipelines along that path are aected, the results will be
catastrophic for the region, with substantial gas outages a surety. Interestingly,
shortages are not restricted to the winter scenario. These risks, by far, outweigh
the benets of lower transportation costs for the West.
The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline system alleviates the problem in the Southern
part of Europe but the current plans do not extend the network to the North
beneting only the few countries en route: Bulgaria, Greece and Italy. For
some of these countries, the pipeline gives clear benets vis-a-vis the status quo
regarding supply security.
How far do the benets of TAP reach? The average marginal contribution
of TAP to risk is the highest for Greece and Bulgaria (-42 and -39%), high
for Romania, Turkey and Italy (-21.4, -11.4 and -8.4%) and hits Poland most
adversely at 0.16%.
A similar analysis for NS2 depends heavily on whether it is an additional
pipeline or there is a shift in existing connections to the North. If the former is
true, it brings massive benets to Switzerland, Belgium, France, the Netherlands
and the UK as well as reduces risks in Italy, Austria, Germany and Poland. The
highest losses will strike Hungary, Serbia, and Turkey at 0.02%. On the other
hand, if NS2 comes in a bundle, disruptions may create massive shortages in
Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, Ukraine, Romania and Serbia,
additionally harming Bulgaria, Italy, Poland and, to a smaller extent, Germany,
the Czech Republic and Turkey, creating savings in Belgium, the Netherlands,
Switzerland and France only.
These results are generally in line with the division between supporters and
opponents of the project (see, for instance, de Jong et al., 2020). Note that
Germany and Austria face increased risks as well, their supportive stance can be
explained by their special roles as distributing hubs for Eastern Europe under
these scenarios. This is better modelled by a cooperative game theory approach
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(Sziklai, Kóczy, and Csercsik, 2020).
5 Conclusion
We have looked at the negative eect of the cost of disruptions in the system
for each player. Our approach is very simple: by taking the same probability,
we ignore dierences in political, environmental and terrorist risks or even in
the size or signicance of a pipeline. Given the enormous observed dierences
in supply risk, we are condent in having found the weak links. Concerning the
methodology: The Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall methods are the
two most commonly applied risk measures. We chose the latter since, in contrast
to VaR, it is a coherent measure (Acerbi and Tasche, 2002); furthermore, VaR
has been heavily criticised recently, see e.g. (Embrechts, 2000) or (Sarykalin
et al., 2014). Heckmann et al. (2015) oer a comprehensive review on measuring
risks related to supply chains.
At the time of writing, it is not entirely clear yet whether Nord Stream 2
can actually be completed and politics may aect its operation later, too. Most
likely, however, the pipeline will get completed with the described eects. We
must realise, however, that network disruptions also harm Russia: the shortages
mean less gas sold for Russia. Russia has already made steps to contain the
damages with the construction of TurkStream and Balkan Stream. Whether
these steps are sucient to compensate the region, we plan to investigate in
another paper.
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